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Title 
Children of Exception: Redefining Categories of Illegality and Citizenship in Canada 
 
Meloni Francesca, Rousseau Cecile, Montgomery Catherine 
Children & Society  
Abstract  
This article examines legal discourses on precarious status children in Canada over the 
last decade. Drawing on different theoretical frameworks and taking into account laws 
and court decisions, the paper will examine the way in which precarious status children 
are regarded as powerless subjects in need of protection and as threatening others. The 
article argues that these two apparently contrasting discourses are embedded within 
specific socio-historical constructions of childhood and children’s citizenship which 
deny and limit their agency and conceive of their claim to membership as illegitimate. 
In the case of precarious status children, illegality and citizenship need to be redefined 
in a developmental perspective, questioning the potential risks associated with  
prevalent moral and social assumptions on childhood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
  
He is here, and he is not here. It is within this condition of existence that they exist. 
Nadine Gordimer, The Pickup  
 
 
Introduction  
Among the 7 million immigrants who live in Canada (UNDESA 2009), it is estimated 
that a small but significant number –from approximately 200,000 (Jiminez 2006) to 
500,000 (SSG 2006) are undocumented. Children who don’t have legal status, or whose 
parents are illegal, are a particularly vulnerable group. In fact, even when they hold 
citizenship and legal status, children may be subjected to deportation along with their 
parents and they often have limited or no access to health and other services (Ruiz-
Casares et al. 2010; Montgomery 2002). Their social and political status is 
acknowledged in an ambiguous way in legal discourse: they exist “here and not here,” 
in an indefinite zone between legality and illegality, citizenship and non-citizenship.   
This paper explores the treatment of non status children in laws and court 
decisions over the last decade, a period which corresponds to an increased 
“securitization” of immigration policies and the weakening of immigrants’ rights and 
freedoms in Canada (Crépeau and Nakache 2006). As we will argue, children’s limited 
entitlement to rights needs to be understood not only within the context of recent 
restrictive immigration policies, but also in light of socio-historical assumptions about 
children as “semi-citizens”, dependent on their parents. This analysis aims to 
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understand the complexity and ambiguity of laws regarding precarious status children, 
by demonstrating how the categories of illegality and citizenship are re-defined and 
complexified in relation to minors.  
The paper is divided into three sections which examine respectively theoretical 
perspectives dealing with the categories of illegality, citizenship, and childhood; legal 
discourse on children’s rights in Canada; and, thirdly, the complexity underlying the 
application of the law. 
 
1. Illegality, Citizenship and Childhood: Towards a Theoretical Framework 
Prior to reviewing Canadian laws and court decisions on precarious status children, it is 
crucial to contextualize the categories of illegality, citizenship, and childhood. We will 
refer here to four theoretical frameworks: the first and second will be useful in order to 
unpack the definitions of illegality and citizenship, while the third and the fourth will 
help to examine the category of childhood. These four ways of seeing and approaching 
undocumented children propose a critical approach to citizenship, childhood, and 
illegality and provide a sound starting point for understanding the complexity of 
children’s immigration status, as well as for understanding the contradictory legal 
attitudes towards migrant minors, which will be played out in legal hearings and 
appeals   
 
1.1 Unpacking Illegality 
To grasp non status children’s limited rights and access to services, and their uncertain 
existence as being “here” and “not here”, it is useful to refer to the literature on 
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undocumented immigration, in particular to the critical study of illegality as a socio-
historical construction (Goldring, Berinstein, and Bernhard 2009; Ngai 2004). These 
studies go beyond the binary opposition between legality and illegality, taking into 
account the construction and institutionalization of multiple forms of “legal illegality”. 
By highlighting the ambiguous relations between legality and illegality (Heyman 
1999), this literature has conceived of irregular migration as a dynamic socio-historical 
process, rather than a static concept. Calavita (1998), for instance, analyzes how 
Spanish exclusionary policies relentlessly “irregularize” Third World immigrants, 
consigning them to the margins of the economy. With respect to the Canadian context, 
Goldring (2009) advocates the use of “precarious status” to describe variable forms of 
irregular status and illegality, interrogating the social, administrative, legal and political 
institutionalization of multiple forms of precariousness, which is accompanied by 
limited access to public services. In this article we will adopt the term “precarious 
status” in order to define different forms of children’s legal and non legal status which 
restrict their entitlement to rights in the Canadian context. 
 
1.2 Unpacking Children’s Citizenship 
Precarious status and the claim to national membership are also complexified in 
relation to the specific dimension of age. To examine the complexity of children’s 
citizenship, as defined in the Canadian legislation, two subfields within this literature 
are particularly relevant.. The first perspective draws on the extensive feminist critique 
on the exclusion of women from citizenship (Canning and Rose 2001). As occurred in 
the past for women, children are barred from full citizenship due to their alleged 
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dependence and incapacity to make rational and informed decisions (Breen 2006). 
Cohen (2005), among others, has examined the way in which the construction of 
children’s “semi-citizenship” has been grounded within a paternalistic discourse, 
relegating them to a mere status as ‘minors’. From this point of view, childhood is 
conceived to be a mere preparatory stage to adulthood. During this period, children’s 
interests and agency are rarely acknowledged.  
The second perspective has analyzed the creation of stateless (Boyden and Hart 
2007) and “alien citizens” (Bosniak 2008), persons who are citizens by virtue of their 
birth but who are presumed to be foreign by the mainstream culture and by the state. 
Bhabha (2009) insightfully explores the alien citizenship of children of undocumented 
parents, studying the ambiguities surrounding birthright citizenship, and pointing out 
that the children’s status has been seen as deriving from their parents. This particular 
category of children is described by Bhabha as “Arendt’s children”, drawing on 
Arendt’s analysis of the emergence of statelessness after the Second World War. The 
definition includes a wide array of minors who share three characteristics: they are 
under eighteen years of age; they are, or they might be, separated from their parents or 
legal guardians; and they are not members of any country because of their status or 
their parents’ status. Montgomery (2002), referring to the case of unaccompanied 
minors in Quebec, suggests that their double status as refugee claimants and as minors 
makes them outsiders in the “imagined community” which, in turn, limits their access 
to services and increases their vulnerability. 
 
1.3 Unpacking Childhood 
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Children’s semi-citizenship and statelessness also have to be understood within the 
framework of socio-cultural assumptions about childhood which underlie the historical 
dimension of international and Canadian laws regarding children. Aries (1962) was one 
of the first to draw attention to the social and historical specificity of modern childhood. 
According to Aries, the category of children gradually grew into existence in the upper 
classes in the XVI and XVII centuries with the emergence of the bourgeois notions of 
family, home and individualism. In the XX century, he argues, the notion of childhood 
was widely accepted by upper and lower classes as a specific developmental stage in 
which the particular needs of children should be satisfied by a nurturing family. 
Building on Aries’ insights, other scholars have contributed to framing the emergence 
of children as a distinctive group in the history of law and civil rights (Qvortrup 1991). 
After the Second World War, child protection rights movements were developed, 
bringing the delivery of specific services, especially with regards to child abuse and 
neglect and the universalisation of children’s rights (Scheper-Hughes and Sargent 
1998). Children were thus recognized as a specific vulnerable group which the family 
and the State should protect and be responsible for.  
 
1.4 Unpacking Immigrant Children 
In policy discourses, the portrait of children as vulnerable is challenged when talking 
about youth from minority groups. To understand the social representations of 
immigrant youth, we will refer here to the literature addressing policies and cultural 
views that depict immigrant children as risks and threats to national security, as well as 
to the literature analyzing the role that race and racialization play in the production of 
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social exclusion (Hopkins, Dwyer, and Bressey 2008; Peake and Kobayashi 2002). 
Otherness, conceived of as a socially constructed process, adds another dimension to 
the cultural view of immigrant children and their entitlement to membership. As 
minors, these youth are perceived as being in need of protection. A paradox arises, 
however, when these same youth are also considered to be potentially threatening 
others. These two types of representations – as both vulnerable and as potentially 
dangerous – may in fact reflect two opposing yet convergent ways of denying 
children’s agency. On the one hand, as already discussed, they are considered 
vulnerable, in need of being protected by adults who speak on their behalf. On the other 
hand, they are considered to be threatening others who should assume the consequences 
of decisions which they often have not made. In both cases they are not heard in terms 
of who they are: young individuals who have personal and collective voices to 
represent their experience and decisions.  
A number of examples illustrate this ambivalence towards migrant youth whose 
childhood is partially negated. With regard to undocumented children, Uehling (2008) 
has examined how the Division of Unaccompanied Children Services  in the United 
States has constructed non status minors as “a window on the complex relationship 
between humanitarianism and security”. In fact, while protecting them as vulnerable 
subjects, the state exercises its power through measures of detention and deportation. 
With respect to US born children with non-status parents, Chavez (2008) has examined 
the construction of the narrative of  “anchor babies,” a metaphor meant to capture the 
strategy among undocumented immigrants of having a child in the United States in 
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order to obtain US citizenship. Popular representations of babies as anchors may thus 
point to their danger to the nation and their illegitimate claims to membership. 
 
These different perspectives on childhood help to make sense of the complex 
representations of immigrant minors which underlie policies and political discourses. A 
close examination of laws and court decisions in Canada provides an excellent 
illustration of the disparities and contradictions inherent both in citizenship and 
childhood, particularly of the tensions between two contradictory, yet converging 
discourses on children as both vulnerable subjects and threats to the nation.  
 
2. Legal Discourse in Canada 
Regarding children’s rights, Canadian law considers the state to be responsible for 
children’s protection and welfare, at least in theory if not always in practice. Since 
World War II, the best interest principle, stating that the parent or the legal guardian has 
the primary responsibility for protecting a minor’s rights and determining her or his 
best interest, has become the cornerstone in children’s legislation . Nevertheless, when 
a child is suspected to be at risk of abuse or neglect by his or her parents, the state is 
considered to act as the arbiter of best interest.  
The best interest is also the paramount consideration of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, signed by the Canadian government in 1990 and ratified in 1991. 
By ratifying the Convention, Canada signed a formal engagement to comply with the 
articles of the Convention and to implement children’s rights. Of particular relevance to 
 9 
precarious status children are the following articles: not separating children from their 
parents; ensuring family reunification ; and assuring the right to be heard .  
Regarding the application of rights of precarious status minors, the issue of 
protection becomes more complicated. A crucial problem, highlighted by many reports, 
is the discrimination of specific groups of children based on their status categories. The 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2003), for instance, has voiced concern 
about the detention of undocumented minors, the exclusion of non-status children from  
the school system, the absence of a national policy on unaccompanied asylum-seeking 
children, and the delays and barriers to family reunification.  
Further problems are created in relation to the application of the best interest 
principle in the immigration processes. In 2002, the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act introduced for the first time the obligation for decision-makers to 
consider children’s best interest. The Canadian Council for Refugees (2004) applauds 
the introduction of the best interest principle as a welcome step, but notes at the same 
time that it is not sufficient in itself to protect children’s rights. While the Act takes into 
account the best interest principle in very specific cases, such as applications on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds, it is not applied to all decisions concerning 
children, as stated by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
With respect to the right to citizenship, Canadian law is based on jus soli, 
according to which every child born in Canada is entitled to citizenship. Nevertheless, a 
new law amending the Citizenship Act came into effect in 2009, limiting birthright 
citizenship in two ways. First, Canadian-born children can only be entitled to 
citizenship if at least one of their parents is a permanent resident or citizen of Canada. 
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Second, Canadian parents cannot transmit their citizenship to generations born overseas 
after one generation. This means that children born overseas in countries based on jus 
sanguinis, that is to say countries where citizenship is determined not by place of birth 
but by having a parent who is a citizen of the nation, may become stateless. Such 
restrictions on citizenship have raised many concerns regarding the potential 
statelessness of children born overseas, the creation of a second class of citizens, and 
the negative impact on individual choices of working or studying outside Canada 
(Galloway 2009 ).  
 
3. The Application of The Law 
Canadian courts have wrestled with the tension between children’s best interest and 
issues relating to national security. This tension is particularly evident in cases 
concerning the deportation of precarious status children and their parents. A key court 
decision involving the best interest is  Baker v. Canada, which sets out the case of an 
undocumented Jamaican woman who was ordered  to be deported with her four 
Canadian children in 1992. Ms. Baker applied for an exemption on the basis of 
compassionate and humanitarian considerations, arguing that she was the sole caregiver 
for two of her Canadian-born children and that her two other children depended on her 
for emotional support. Her application was refused. Subsequently, Ms. Baker applied to 
the Supreme Court for a review of the case, with the objective of determining whether 
federal immigration authorities must treat the best interest of the Canadian child as a 
primary consideration in assessing an applicant under the Immigration Act. The 
Supreme Court agreed that the Federal Court's decision was unreasonable and that, 
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although the best interest was not of primary consideration, immigration authorities 
should "give substantial weight, and be alert, alive and sensitive to the rights of 
children, to their best interests, and to the hardship that may be caused to them by a 
negative decision" (SCR 1999: 75),  following an approach that respects humanitarian 
and compassionate values.  
 Interestingly, the court decision did not determine that best interest must always 
outweigh other considerations, stating instead that they should be carefully considered 
in a manner consistent with Canada’s humanitarian and compassionate tradition. Thus, 
the best interest of the child is here mentioned as a reflection of humanitarian values 
and of Canadian tradition, rather than as a fundamental right or a duty of the host 
society.  
A more detailed examination of specific cases concerning precarious status 
children will enable allow a more complex understanding of the legal ambiguities in 
cases dealing with children’s illegality and citizenship and also highlight the relative 
absence of their voices. In the following examination of three different legal cases, we 
will look specifically and more closely at the fractures between children's rights as 
enshrined in international conventions and national legislation, and children’s 
perceptions of their status as non-agents and citizens of exception. 
 
3.1 She Is Canadian, Her Mother May Be Deported  
In the first case to be considered (Hawthorne v. Canada), the child was eight years old 
when her mother left Jamaica and moved to Canada, in 1992, to join the child’s father. 
Her mother never gained legal status and, after a short time, left the child’s father due 
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to physical and emotional abuse. In 1999, the father sponsored the child’s admission as 
a permanent resident but, since her arrival in Canada, the child lived with her mother 
who supported her financially. When a removal order was issued to the mother, the 
woman made an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (H & C 
application), stating that her removal would cause the child irreparable harm.  The 
child was then 15 and a grade 10 student. She declared that she enjoyed "school a great 
deal" and that she was doing very well. She did not wish to live with her father, since 
she understood that he had been charged with sexually abusing a step-daughter. 
Moreover, she stated that she felt very close to her mother who was very supportive of 
her. As she states: "If my mother is deported to Jamaica, I do not know what I will do. I 
cannot live with my father, but I cannot live alone in Toronto since I am only fifteen 
years old. I would miss my mother desperately". Further, she did not wish to return to 
Jamaica, because she considered "Canada to be my home now" " and felt safe there. As 
well, she said that she wouldn't have the opportunity to pursue her studies in Jamaica, 
since her mother would not be able to financially support her school education: 
 
When I lived in Jamaica, before coming to Canada, my mother sent me money to 
support myself, money that she earned at her job in Canada. She would not be able to 
support me if we were deported to Jamaica and I do not know what would happen to 
me. Also, there is a great deal of crime in Jamaica and I am scared to return there for 
that reason. I feel safe in Canada. (Canada 2001: 5) 
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In spite of the youth’s plea, the immigration officer found that there were 
insufficient grounds to waive the removal order and argued that the deportation would 
not cause any hardship. The Federal Court noted that, since the child had lived 
separated from her mother until she was eight years old, their relationship could not 
have been so close and that their separation would not be a major hardship for either of 
them (FCT 2001) thus giving more weight to the judge’s opinion than to the child’s 
subjective experience. Further, the judge stated that if her daughter lived in Jamaica 
before, he did not see the hardship of living there again (Canada 2001: 3). There was no 
mention that the child was a Canadian resident and that she considered Canada to be 
her home, since she had established social relations and attachment there. 
 
The Federal Court decision is an example of insensitivity to child’s interests and 
voice, as well as this child's political and social rights as a permanent resident. 
Although the child clearly stated that she did not want to live with her father or to 
return to Jamaica, her voice was not heard in the judgment. Fortunately, the appeal 
court contested the court’s decision, pointing out that “hardship is not a term of art (…) 
Children will rarely, if ever, be deserving of any hardship” (FCA 2002: 9).  
 
3.2 They Are Canadian, Deported with Their Parents   
In a second case (Pillai v. Canada), a Canadian four-year-old boy and his three-year-
old sister faced removal from Canada, after their Tamil parents had been refused 
refugee status and permanent residence based on humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds. When the negative H&C response was given in December 2007, there was an 
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increasing state of alert about the risk, for Tamils, of arbitrary detention and torture by 
the Sri Lankan authorities. Their parents, of Christian Tamil faith, claimed to have been 
arrested, sexually abused and tortured in Sri Lanka by the Tamil Tigers and the Sri 
Lankan police. Although the father had been diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, their story was considered to lack credibility.  
 The grounds advanced by the applicants to justify their application for 
permanent residence were the risk of detention and torture should they return to Sri 
Lanka, and the best interest of their children. The H&C officer remarked that the risk of 
arbitrary detention could effectively exist for the Tamil family, but that it should not 
have “severe consequences” (FC 2008: 6). Further, the officer stated that because the 
children were young, and “the family remains the centre of their social development”, 
he was “satisfied they will be able to transition successfully into Sri Lankan society” 
(FC 2008: 27). As a result, he found that re-integration would not cause the children 
unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship.  
In this decision, there is no specific examination of the children's best interest. 
The children were not heard, and there was no consideration of of their opinion 
regarding their deportation and re-integration in Sri Lanka. They are considered, due to 
their young age, simply as dependent on their parents, and consequently tied to their 
parents' migratory status.  There is no mention that these children are also Canadian 
citizens, and that they are in their formative years of development. The Court of Appeal 
briefly concludes that the best interest “must be examined with care and weighed with 
other factors such as public interest factors”. It would thus appear that  reasons, such as 
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public interest factors, outweighed the humanitarian grounds and the citizenship rights 
of these two Canadian children. 
 
 
3.4  She Is a Refugee, She Is Deported 
In the third case (A.M.R.I. and K.E.R.), a 12 year-old girl arrived in Canada from 
Mexico in 2008. Her refugee claim was accepted in 2010, based on the claim that she 
was abused by her mother who had the legal custody of the child. Shortly thereafter, the 
father, with whom she lived, was denied refugee status in Canada and moved to 
Norway. The girl lived in Toronto with her aunt, who had commenced a custody 
application. At this time, the mother invoked the Hague Convention on International 
Child Abduction in an appeal ordering the girl’s return to Mexico. The aunt asked to be 
added as a party to the appeal application and appointed counsel for her niece, but their 
motion was denied. The hearing eventually proceeded on an uncontested basis, without 
the participation of the father, the aunt or the girl. A few months later, the application 
judge granted an order for her immediate return to Mexico. The girl was removed from 
her school in Toronto under police escort, and flown to Mexico despite her protests and 
without notice to her father or her aunt.  
The judges at the appeal court remarked that the application judge made several 
errors with regard to the case, including the fact that the girl was not present or 
represented at the hearing, that her refugee status was never seriously considered, and 
that she was taken by police from school and sent back to Mexico without even a 
chance to speak to the aunt with whom she had been living for nearly 2 years. 
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According to the Court of Appeal’s decision, this case raises significant 
international, human rights and family law issues in relation to the return of a refugee 
child to her country of origin. Normally, a child who is a refugee must be accorded 
procedural protections under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 
proceedings to return the child to her country of origin pursuant to the Hague 
Convention. In this context, the Charter requires that the application judge conduct an 
assessment of the risks associated with returning the child, and that the child has the 
right to representation, to notice of the application, and to respond and to state her 
views. The case of this child was considered as an exception from this procedural 
protection: even if entitled to refugee status and international protection, the Hague 
Convention’s reasons and the legal custody of her mother prevailed on the Refugee 
Convention, the Canadian Charter and the child’s rights. 
 
4. Discussion 
The cases presented include a wide array of minors with diverse migratory 
statuses rather than focusing only on undocumented children and minors whose parents 
are non-status. Referring to the definition of “Arendt’s children” (Bhabha 2009), we 
argue that the rigid categories of illegality and citizenship fail to capture the zone of 
exception where immigrant children’s rights are located. The cases illustrate how, in 
court decisions relating to undocumented minors, Canadian minors, and refugee 
minors, children’s rights are often considered as revocable, rather than absolute. 
Examining the Canadian legal discourse on children’s best interest and rights and 
their application, it is evident that there is a gap between the human rights enshrined in 
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international conventions as “abstract principles” and “social ideals” (Ignatieff and 
Gutmann 2001), on the one side, and their implementation in institutional procedure, on 
the other side (Ruiz-Casares et al. 2010). As highlighted in the examination of these 
court decisions,  legal discourse is grounded in the idea that children’s protection as 
citizens is dependent on their parents’ nationality, a notion contrary to the non-
discriminatory provision of national and international law regarding children’s rights 
and family unity.  Further, the best interest principle, the cornerstone of Canadian and 
international legislation, is problematically applied to precarious status children, since it 
is often only one among many factors examined by immigration officers and courts. 
In the court decisions reviewed, two relevant and complementary assumptions 
about children and citizenship can be singled out. First, minors are conceived of as 
vulnerable subjects in need of protection,. Second, migrant children are also portrayed 
as threatening others which, like their parents, are not entitled to be members of the 
community. These two images do not contradict one another, as it might seem, but 
rather mutually sustain each other. The common thread that links the two together is the 
adult-centered approach, which characterizes children as being both vulnerable and 
voiceless. Whether they are acknowledged as threats, or as vulnerable subjects in need 
of protection, these children are assumed to lack moral agency and, consequently, to 
have fewer social and political rights (Breen 2006). They fall into a gray zone, where 
their voices are essentially muted and their political rights are not acknowledged.  
The role played by adult-centered perspectives is evident in the three court 
decisions examined. Strikingly, in all these cases, the children’s voices are not listened 
to. In the first court case, even though the girl had clearly stated that she did not want to 
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return to Jamaica or to leave her mother, the immigration officer did not take her 
opinion into account. In the third case, the girl was not represented at the hearing and, 
at the moment of her deportation, the police did not pay attention to her when she tried 
to explain that she had refugee status. These court decisions are permeated by the 
notion of children as infans, “someone who cannot speak”, which has characterized 
children’s “politics of mutism” (O'Neill 1994: 6), the absence of children’s voices as 
autonomous subjects. 
Moreover, in both the second and third court cases, a Canadian citizen and a 
refugee are deported due to their parent’s removal despite the fact that the children 
themselves are entitled to citizenship rights or refugee status. In these cases, minors are 
once again understood as dependent subjects. The public interest factors are clearly the 
most important dimensions weighed in these two decisions, and the best interest 
principle is considered as only one among many other relevant issues. However, the 
predominance of the security dimension is also sustained by the notion that children are 
powerless subjects, dependent on their parents, and should thus be deported in the case 
of their parent’s removal.  
Finally, it is interesting to observe that, in the case of Canadian-born children, 
their citizenship rights are rarely acknowledged. They are conceived of as non-citizens, 
or as second class citizens, in a zone of exception where their rights can be revoked. 
Their diminished entitlement to rights has been worsened further by the increasing 
restriction of immigration policies that has occurred over recent  decades. In the first 
and second court cases, the citizenship rights of Canadian children with non status 
parents are never mentioned as an important factor that could call into question their 
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deportation or their parents’ removal. In the best case scenario, the family is allowed to 
stay in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, by reason of the children’s 
vulnerability, but not by virtue of the children’s rights as citizens.  
As we have attempted to demonstrate by drawing on different theoretical 
frameworks which critically reflect on the categories of illegality, citizenship and 
childhood, both the compassion-based agenda which conceives of children as powerless 
subjects, and the security dimension, which portrays minors as threats, limit children’s 
agency. Both are embedded within specific socio-historical constructions of childhood 
and children’s citizenship. Fassin (2005), among others, has also highlighted the 
tension between the practices of “compassion and repression” in immigration policies, 
pointing out how these two are intimately linked together as part of a moral economy 
which bars immigrants from social and political life. Ticktin (2005), with respect to 
immigration policies in France, suggests that policing and humanitarianism are two 
sides of the same coin – a regime based on sovereign exceptions, which creates non-
rights-bearing, apolitical and non-agentive victims. Following from Ticktin, we argue 
that precarious status children can be considered as “children of exception”, meaning 
that their rights are acknowledged based on the exceptionality of each individual case, 
rather than within a systematic form of justice. Interestingly, several of the cases 
discussed above were overturned on appeal, meaning that children’s deportation is 
waived not on the grounds of their political rights, but on the grounds of benevolence, 
that is to say, on an exceptional basis. 
Considered as non-citizens, these minors live in an uncertain zone between 
legality and illegality, and they often have limited access to services such health and 
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education. Their life is considered by the law as “bare life” as mere bodies excluded 
from political rights, as opposed to bios, the morally and politically qualified life of 
citizens (Agamben 1995a). Deprived of citizenship rights and limited in their access to 
public services, these children are left with only abstract human rights; that is to say, 
their future in Canada is dependent on compassionate grounds. Agamben, in relation to 
refugees, observes that “it is necessary resolutely to separate the concept of the refugee 
from that of the Rights of man, and to cease considering the right of asylum (which in 
any case is being drastically restricted in the legislation of the European states) as the 
conceptual category in which the phenomenon should be impressed” (Agamben 1995b: 
116).  In the case of children, there is a need to consider the limits of the abstract rights 
of justice and equality, to protect precarious status children, and to rethink the best 
interest as a notion which should take into account not only children’s agency but also 
the social networks which define their belonging to a community. Shachar (2009), for 
instance, proposes to adopt, as an alternative to jus soli or jus sanguinis, the model of 
jus nexi, which defines children’s citizenship as based on factual membership and 
social attachment rather than birthright entitlement. In summary, we should question 
our moral and social assumptions concerning the rights of precarious status children, 
along with our definitions of citizenship and membership. Only in this way will it be 
possible to avoid the perpetuation of exclusionary practices through policies of 
compassion and repression.  
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